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 The Impact of Privatisation on Wages:




We present quasi-experimental estimates of the eﬀect of privatisation on wages in
the Portuguese banking sector for the period 1989-97. The design of the reform and
the nature of dataset employed provide an important opportunity to analyse the eﬀects
of privatisation on diﬀerent demographic groups, using multiple control groups, and
taking into consideration the timing of the eﬀects. We ﬁnd a positive relationship
between time of restructuring and wage variation regardless the choice of the control
group. Retained employees in privatised ﬁrms did experience lower wage growth rates,
but only during the ﬁrst two years after the ownership change. Estimates for top
managers appear to contradict the theoretical predictions.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The impact of privatisation on labour market outcomes is potentially substantial. On the
one hand, public sector industrial relations are to some extent separate from private sector
ones and have speciﬁcf e a t u r e s . For instance, public sector organisations tend to pursue
am u l t i p l i c i t yo fo f t e nc o n ﬂicting objectives whereas private sector ﬁr m sc a nf o c u sm o r e
narrowly on generating proﬁts. In addition, public pay determination tends to respond to
political pressures rather than to markets or ﬁrm performance. In the past, public union
leaders have often been able to gain advantages by exploiting public corporation managers
contacts with politicians and members of government, in a near or total monopoly bargaining
position. On the other hand, much of the debate about the desirability of privatisation
has included labour market outcomes - employment and pay levels. In contrast to trade
unions, the proponents of privatisation hope that privatisation restructuring will reduce
over-manning and excessive pay levels and beneﬁts.
However, many of the studies of privatisation to date have focused on processes and
institutions. In fact, most of the work has actually been concerned with whether or not
the transfer of ownership from public to private sector leads to an improvement in cor-
porate performance.1 Important distinctions between cost/defensive and revenue/strategic
restructuring have been observed by Grosfeld and Roland (1997) but the exact channels
through which the expected eﬃciency improvements of the ﬁrm occur are still not known.
1The research on this topic is voluminous, see for instance, the survey by Megginson and Netter (2001).
2R e s e a r c hf o c u s i n go nt h ee ﬀects of privatisation on labour market outcomes (both theoreti-
cal and empirical) is, in general, scarce, inconclusive and almost exclusively conﬁned to the
United Kingdom experience.2 One exception is the (empirical) eﬀect on the total level of
employment of the ﬁrm, which is often examined in the industrial literature as an extra
ﬁrm performance indicator. In respect to the impact of privatisation on wages (both em-
ployee pay and non-pecuniary beneﬁts) there is no systematic exploration in the literature.
But the scarce empirical evidence presented so far, refutes the eﬀects that are tradition-
ally predicted: pay levels are relatively inﬂexible and tend to increase above-average after
privatisation (Pendleton, 1997).
This study looks at the eﬀects of privatisation on wages in Portugal where public own-
ership was widespread.3 More speciﬁcally, the eﬀects of direct transfer of ownership from
public to private sector, are examined in a single sector: the Portuguese banking industry.4
An u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent arguments form the basis of this industry selection. First, until the
mid-1990s, the privatisation programme was asymmetric and biased sectorially. Its major in-
cidence, in terms of number of ﬁrms comprised or in terms of volume of revenues generated,
was in the banking industry (Ministério das Finanças, 1999, page 15). The privatisation
comprised eleven companies, which accounted for more than 83% of banking employment
in 1985, and raised about 3,3 billions of EUROS, the bulk (48%) of the total sales of state
2In contrast, the eﬀect of market’s deregulation, a related policy, has deserved a relatively remarkable
attention in the labour literature, although mainly reﬂecting US experience. For a recent survey, see Peoples
(1998).
3Portugal is classiﬁed as the third largest privatiser in the OECD countries, after the New Zealand and
the United Kingdom (OECD, 1998).
4Although there are diﬀerent forms of privatisation, this study only focuses on the eﬀects of sales of public
companies on wages.
3enterprises until the second quarter of 1995. Moreover, in contrast to some other economic
sectors, where privatisation is less advanced and still ongoing, privatisation of the entire
banking industry was started and completed between 1989 and 1996. In addition, the de-
velopments of the Portuguese ﬁnancial sector, privatisation and deregulation, are considered
a remarkable success: ”the main reform objectives were met”’ without ”the concomitant
ﬁnancial instability experienced by many other OECD countries” (OECD, 1999, p. 94).
Second, the design of the privatisation programme and the structure of the banking sector
provide a notable and promising opportunity to evaluate the economic eﬀects of a change
in ownership. Indeed, in contrast with the remaining industries, the privatisation in the
ﬁnancial sector did not aﬀect all public ﬁrms. There still continues to be a large state-owned
ﬁnancial group, which provide us with a valuable natural candidate as a control group to
examine the eﬀects of the reform. Moreover, the Portuguese banking industry structure is
diverse, as will be described below, allowing a variety of possible ways of deﬁn i n gac o n t r o l
group, and therefore provides multiple and fruitful comparisons.
Second, the design of the privatisation programme and the structure of the banking sector
provide a notable and promising opportunity to evaluate the economic eﬀects of a change in
ownership. Indeed, in contrast with the remaining industries, privatisation in the ﬁnancial
sector did not aﬀect all public ﬁrms. There still continues to be a large state-owned ﬁnancial
group, which provides us with a valuable natural candidate as a control group to examine
the eﬀects of the reform. Moreover, the Portuguese banking industry structure is diverse, as
will be described below, allowing a variety of possible ways of deﬁning a control group, and
therefore, provides multiple and fruitful comparisons
4Finally, although there is little research focusing on the banking labour market, prior
research provides evidence of rent-sharing behaviour in the industry, which potentially raises
the privatisation eﬀect. The structure and the industrial relations in the banking industry -
namely role of unions, level and trend of unionisation density, wage bargaining mechanisms,
ﬁrms size and ownership structure- contrasts sharply with those prevailing in the remaining
sectors. Given these dissimilarities, the eﬀects of privatisation are likely to diﬀer across
industries. Comparison of the eﬀects of privatisation in diﬀerent sectors is beyond the scope
of this study.
This study uses individual-level data from a particularly appropriate dataset collected
annually by the Portuguese Ministry for Social Security and Labour, Quadros de Pessoal,t o
evaluate the impact of privatisation on the wages of workers whose ﬁrms were transferred
from the state to the private sector. The longitudinal nature of the dataset allows us to build
a panel dataset covering a period before and after the reform and a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimator is adopted to infer the impacts of the policy reform.
This paper is structured as follows. Next Section 2 reviews the theoretical predictions
concerning the impact of privatisation on wages and critically evaluates prior evidence. It
also includes related literature such as wage diﬀerentials in public and private sectors with
particular reference to Portuguese industrial sectors. Section 3 discusses the main features
of the privatisation programme and the labour relations prevailing in the banking sector.
Section 4 describes the methodology employed to evaluate the eﬀects of the policy reform.
The empirical implementation and evidence are outlined in Section 5. Section 6 oﬀers some
concluding remarks.
52 Privatisation and wages: theory and previous evidence
The theoretical literature on the impact of privatisation on wages, although fairly limited,
is not consensual. Haskel and Szymansky (1992, 1993) develop the ﬁrst model, which
is an integration of the standard bargaining approach (right-to-manage) and the regula-
tion/privatisation literature, to provide the usual predictions about the eﬀects of the trans-
fer of ownership. Wages are likely to decline as the movement from public to private sector
involves a shift in the public ﬁrms’ objective function towards proﬁt maximisation and a
reduction in the union bargaining power. Therefore, a convergence of pay levels between
privatised and other private ﬁrms is expected to occur. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the prediction
made from the well established public/private wage diﬀerential literature: if on average,
workers with similar attributes are better paid in the public than in the private sector, then
privatisation will put the former in a worse position.5
In contrast, the predictions which emerge from the subsequent work are ambiguous.
Haskel and Sanchis (1995) extend the previous analysis by including workers’ eﬀort in the
bargaining process. If privatisation raises eﬀort, ﬁr m sm a yb ew i l l i n gt os e t t l ef o rh i g h e r
wages, depending on trade union preferences. Similarly, De Fraja (1993) using a model,
where a ﬁrm is privatised into a market of Cournot players, suggests the same result: wages
in the privatised ﬁrm may go up (down), according to the lower (higher) degree of market
competition, whereas the other ﬁrm’s wage increases as a consequence of its rival’s privati-
sation. Finally, Goerke (1998) employing a slightly diﬀerent framework, a shirking model of
5However, in economies in transition and also in our case, the wage premium tends to be in favour of
private workers. As Blanchard (1997) highlights, it reﬂects the apparent willingness of state to trade-oﬀ
wages for (higher) employment.
6eﬃciency wages, obtains again unclear predictions. Privatisation may raise or lower wages
depending on how it is modelled (as a stricter control or stronger proﬁto r i e n t a t i o n )a n do n
the wage setting mechanisms.
Apart from these models, which look at the eﬀects on the overall wage distribution, there
is a vast growing literature concerning the conditions that aﬀect the remuneration of one
speciﬁc occupation: top or chief executive managers.6 According to this line of reasoning,
the compensation of top managers/executives tends to rise after privatisation as pay scale
constraints are released, executives are more explicitly linked to observable measures of ﬁrm
performance and have more bargaining power. In addition, if privatisation is associated with
an increase in the ﬁrm scale, managers have direct oversight of more activities, and hence
may expect a higher remuneration.
The empirical evidence concerning the eﬀects of privatisation on wages does not generally
reﬂect the diversity of results predicted by the theory. In fact, the work by Bishop and Kay
(1988), Haskel and Szymansky (1993) and Parker and Martin (1996) with reference to the
United Kingdom, the work present by La Porta and Silanes (1999) relating to the Mexican
economy and the recent works by Brainerd (2002), Ho et al. (2002) regarding privatisation
in Russia and China, show an unanimous pattern. Average real wage in privatised ﬁrms
tends to rise after the introduction of the reform, whenever it is related to that of the private
or public sector or the whole economy.
This striking ﬁnding should nevertheless be treated with some caution for diﬀerent rea-
sons. First, excluding the most recent two works, previous research use data collected from
6See, for example, Rosen (1992) for both theoretical and empirical survey.
7company accounts. Thus, an increase in the average wage (calculated as wage costs divided
by the total level of employment) over time, can be distorted by changes in the hours worked
or changes in the composition and attributes of the workforce. For instance, if ﬁrms dis-
proportionately ﬁre low wage workers after privatisation, then the average wage may rise.
Moreover, even if workforce composition remains constant, the wage increase might reﬂect
wage increases in narrow and speciﬁc occupations such as top or executive managers. Sec-
ond, the monopolistic position of many of the privatised ﬁrms studied, makes it impossible
to compare them with similar industry-matched ﬁrms. Therefore, the comparison with the
whole economy may not allow us to isolate privatisation eﬀects from other speciﬁc indus-
try factors (only from the macro business cycle). As Parker and Martin (1996) refer “each
privatised company has its own particular performance determined by the environment in
which it operates”. Finally, in all but Parker and Martin’s (1996) work, the time dimension
of the restructuring process has been largely neglected. As Gupta et al. (2001) discuss, a
full evaluation of the eﬀects of privatisation requires an examination of the desired labour
outcomes throughout three periods: the pre-privatisation period, the privatisation period
and the post-privatisation period. For instance, privatisation may lead initially to pay cuts,
even before the actual transfer of the ownership, which may be reversed if the ﬁrm grows or
gains from future share appreciation.
The empirical literature on the executive labour market corroborates the predictions sug-
gested by the theory. Even though the main focus of this strand relies on ﬁnding which is
the best explanation, among competing theories, to account for changes in executive remu-
neration, all research seems to conﬁrm a signiﬁcant increase in the wage level of executive
8managers after privatisation. For instance, Wolfram (1998) reports a wage increase of 200%
for the chief executive oﬃcers after privatisation of British electricity industry. The same
conclusion is obtained when a broader concept of executives is used. For instance, Bishop
and Kay (1988) detect an increase of 173%, 79% and 81% in the director remuneration in 12
privatised, 5 public and a sample of leading private ﬁrms, respectively, while La Porta and
Silanes (1999) report a relative wage increase of 47% for white collar employees.
There is little research explicitly concerned with the Portuguese banking labour market.
Vieira et al. (1997) and Kiker and Santos (1991) attest a signiﬁcant but unstable wage pre-
mium to banking workers relative to the average paid by other industries. Apart from this,
there is further, but indirect, evidence of rent-sharing behaviour in the banking industry.
While Portugal and Centeno (2001) ﬁnd that the public/private wage diﬀerential in Por-
tugal is the widest within European countries, Vieira et al. (1997) points out a signiﬁcant
wage premium to large ﬁrms and for workers covered by decentralised collective bargaining
agreements - these are two important features of banking industry as will be discussed in
the following section.
3 Privatisation and the banking labour market
The privatisation programme was introduced in the banking sector, as a further step in
the successful reform of the Portuguese ﬁnancial system (OECD, 1999). This structural
reform, starting in 1984, aimed to put an end to the heavily regulated and nationalised
system imposed in the industry after the 25th April 1974 revolution. Less than one decade
afterwards, when most of the deregulation reforms were already accomplished, including the
9openness of the ﬁnancial intermediation to the private sector and the dismantlement of the
interest rate controls, the privatisation programme was then implemented.
The ﬁrst privatisation law adopted in 1988 (law 84/88 from 20th July) allowed merely
partial privatisation of public enterprises as the State still retained 51 per cent of the equity.
For this ﬁrst phase of privatisation, the government selected four proﬁtable ﬁrms, which
included one medium size bank. In April 1990, after a second Constitutional Amendment
laid down in June 1989, the lei Quadro das Privatizações, (decree-law 11/90 from 5thApril)
was passed allowing full privatisation of enterprises nationalised after 1974. The privatisation
programme was assumed to be an important mechanism for (1) improving the deteriorated
performance of public economic units, (2) modernising and increasing their competitiveness
and (3) widening the participation of Portuguese citizens in the ownership of enterprises,
particularly among workers and small shareholders.7
The ﬁrms being privatised were ﬁrst transformed into corporations, with a prior evalu-
ation being made by two independent entities. But in contrast with some other economic
sectors, (for instance, electricity and telecommunications) the government opted for a policy
of no interfering in the public ﬁrms during the period before privatisation (Naumann, 1995
and Sousa and Cruz, 1995), leaving the economic restructuring for future private owners.
In terms of scheduled order of privatisation, apart from those ﬁrms which were selected
on grounds of performance indicators for the partial privatisation phase (OECD, 1989),
there was no ﬁrm schedule for subsequent ﬁrms’ privatisation (OECD, 1991). Instead, the
timetable was strongly aﬀected by the economic and political domestic cycles’ and by the
7Sousa and Cruz (1995) describe and discuss the economic and ﬁnancial situation of public enterprises.
10international context.
By mid-1997, ten out of twelve public banks became fully private: two banks were pri-
v a t i s e di n1 9 9 1 ,t h r e ei n1 9 9 4 ,a n de a c ho ft h eﬁve remaining banks were privatised in 1989,
1990, 1992, 1993 and 1996, respectively.8,9 The most common privatisation procedure used,
was public oﬀer, and to a much less extent, direct sale or public tender. The broadening
share-ownership goal clearly desired by the authorities was not achieved, instead a manager-
ial dominant type of ownership emerged (although the employees had the right to subscribe
to some part of the capital of the privatised ﬁrm at preferential rates). In most cases, own-
ership returned to former Portuguese groups, which owned them prior to the nationalisation
wave in 1974.10 Due to this private-public-private ownership path, privatisation in Portugal
is termed re-privatisation.
As a result of the divestiture reform, signiﬁcant improvements in terms of productivity
and eﬃciency levels were registered in the Portuguese banking industry. For instance, the
OECD 1999 survey, referring to the commercial banking industry, reports a continuous
increase in the productivity level (balance sheet total per employee), which allowed not
only a reduction in operate/staﬀ costs (from 1.53 per cent of average assets in 1991 to
0.98 percent in 1997) but also a remarkable improvement in the proﬁtability rate (return to
equity) after 1995. This global rise in the eﬃciency level of the industry is also conﬁrmed by
8This total number (ten) of ﬁrms privatised in the banking industry does not coincide with the eleven
ﬁrms privatised reported by the OECD 1999 survey. This discrepancy is due to both the absence of one bank
in the data; the exclusion of one bank, whose privatisation implied the transfer of a minority participation
(15%) to the private sector and the inclusion of the indirect privatisation of a public bank through the
privatisation of the group to which it belongs (see page 22, Ministério das Finanças, 1999).
9According to the privatisation literature, the ﬁrst sale of tranches of shares in each ﬁrm dates the eﬀective
privatisation.
10International investors could buy a limited share of the equity ranging from two to forty percent of sales.
11Pinho (1999), who nevertheless attests to an increase particularly more pronounced among
privatised institutions.
Table 1 exhibits the major trends, in terms of labour outcomes, that occurred during
the implementation of the privatisation programme. For comparison purposes, the public
category refers to the 2 permanent public banks whereas the privatised category includes
the 10 ﬁrms being privatised. National and foreign categories include, respectively, private
domestic and foreign owned-ﬁrms.11
In contrast with public (national and foreign) ﬁrms whose level of employment remained
fairly constant (increased) from 1991 on, the level of employment in privatised ﬁrms dropped
steadily during the reform period.12 Each privatised ﬁrm lost on average 732 employees
between 1989 and 1997 (implying a 23 per cent (3884/3152) rate of overstaﬃng), which
corresponds to a loss of 92 employees per ﬁrm/year during the same period. This is further
conﬁrmed by the increasing number of workers, particularly women, declared unemployed
from the ﬁnancial industry over the referred period despite the absence of any failure or
closing institution. Nevertheless, in terms of job security, at least when measured by the
share of permanent full time workers, there was no deterioration in privatised ﬁrms once this
proportion increased during the entire period of analysis.13
The trend in workers’ wage is also clear: all banking employees experienced a strong
11The number of national (foreign) owned ﬁrms is 6 (8), 6 (11), 9 (15), 15 (14) and 19 (15) in 1989, 1991,
1993, 1995 and 1997, respectively.
12The entry of new small domestic ﬁrms in the market in 1995 and 1997 explains the decline in the average
size of national ﬁrms.
13In some cases, the corporate economic restructuring involves the adoption of less secure job (human
resource) practices, including either temporary or partial employment, in order to achieve more ﬂexible
industrial relations. Cam (1999), for example, reports signiﬁcant jumps in the number of temporary posts
in the Turkish cement industry.
12(real) wage rise, mainly reﬂecting the fast economic growth observed in the economy, after
Portuguese membership of the European Community in 1986. For privatised ﬁrms’ workers
h o w e v e r ,t h ew a g ei n c r e a s e ,c o n ﬁrming prior research, is clearly more pronounced than in
any other ownership category. Between 1989 and 1997, privatised employees enjoyed a
wage increase of 33 percent whilst public, but in particular, national and foreign employees
enjoyed a much modest wage gain of 27, 19 and 14 percent, respectively. This convergence in
payment level is particularly notable as important dissimilarities in terms of human capital
attainments became more evident among the four ownership categories (Table 2). Employees
in privatised ﬁrms, even after the reform, are the least educated, the oldest and the most
experienced in the banking sector. Finally, notice that this simple analysis besides not
accounting for changes in the workforce composition, ignores the time elapsed since the
introduction of the reform in each ﬁrm, which possibly mitigates dynamic privatisation
eﬀects.
In general, the new ﬁrm’s proﬁt orientation is likely to exert a downward pressure on
wages and hence, erode the existent worker rents (Vieira et al., 1997) owed to regula-
tion/nationalisation waves. Nevertheless, the scope for this wage erosion is limited, as unions
in the banking industry represent all of the workforce in the wage bargaining process, regard-
less of the ownership of the bank. Moreover, the union bargaining position in the industry
(historically the largest and most inﬂuential in the country) has been reinforced over the
course of reforms, in contrast with other sectors in the UK and USA, which were exposed
to similar market oriented policies (privatisation/deregulation).14 Indeed, the union par-
14Peoples (1998) reports a decline in the unionisation density after liberalisation of either trucking, telecom-
13ticipation rate in the banking sector has expanded markedly between the period 1974-78
and 1991-95, from 71% to 106% (Cerdeira, 1997). Ap r i o r i ,the decentralised bargaining
system should bring uniform wage levels across ﬁrms within the banking sector, although
the positive diﬀerential between negotiated and eﬀective wage levels has widened since the
early nineties (Aperta et al., 1994).
4 Econometric considerations
This study estimates the impact of privatisation on wages of workers, whose ﬁrm’s ownership
was transferred from state to private hands. In particular, for those aﬀected by the reform,
the main question is: what would their wage have been if the privatisation programme
had not been introduced? The design of the policy reform described in Section 3 makes
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach a natural one to take. This approach considers the
privatisation reform itself an experiment, the treatment, and tries to ﬁnd a naturally occurring
comparison group that could reﬂect the properties of a control group in a properly designed
randomised social experiment. The average eﬀect of the reform on the individuals whose
ﬁrms were privatised, also referred to as the eﬀe c to ft h et r e a t m e n to nt r e a t e d ,is recovered
by comparing the diﬀerence in average behaviour before and after the reform for the treated
with the before and after behaviour of the comparison or control group. Thus, the selection
of the comparison or control group becomes a central part of this evaluation procedure.
To be more precise, let us state formally this evaluation procedure. Let Wi1 and Wi0
represent the logarithm of wage paid to an individual i conditional on the presence and
munications or airlines industry in the USA. This result is also found in developing countries, for instance
in Turkey de-unionisation also accompanied privatisation reform (Cam, 1999).
14absence of treatment (privatisation), respectively. Di is a participation variable that identiﬁes
whether the employee i received treatment, i.e. w a se m p l o y e di naﬁrm that was privatised,
(Di =1 )or not (Di =0 ) . Thus, the impact for the i−th individual of the policy is given by
Wi1 − Wi0 and the average privatisation eﬀect for those individuals whose ﬁrms’ ownership
was transferred from state to private hands is our main question, E(Wi1 − Wi0|Di =1 ) .
Clearly, the evaluation problem in observational studies can be regarded as a missing data
problem since we can not estimate E(Wi0|Di =1 )directly. Suppose that t =0and t =1
represent respectively the period before and after the implementation of the reform. The
key identifying assumption of the simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator consists of
E(Wi0|Di =1 ,t=1 )−E(Wi0|Di =1 ,t=0 )=E(Wi0|Di =0 ,t=1 )−E(Wi0|Di =0 ,t=0 ) .
(1)
This assumption implies that if the privatisation reform had not taken place, the wage
growth in privatised ﬁr m sw o u l dh a v eb e e nt h es a m ea si no t h e rﬁr m st h a tb e l o n gt ot h ec o n -
trol group. Equivalently, diﬀerences in the wage level, between the two ﬁrms’ groups, remain
unchanged in each time period. Therefore, the missing counterfactual, under assumption (1),
can be replaced by the sum of two terms,
E(Wi0|Di =1 ,t=1 )=E(Wi0|Di =1 ,t=0 ) + [ E(Wi0|Di =0 ,t=1 ) −E(Wi0|Di =0 ,t=0 ) ] .
The ﬁrst known right hand-side term corresponds simply to the wage level prevailing in state
ﬁrms that were to become private, before the introduction of the privatisation programme.
15The second term adjusts this wage level by the observed wage growth in the control ﬁrm
group. Under assumption (1), the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator may be obtained by
diﬀerencing wage levels across the treated and control groups and across the two time periods,
The simple (or raw) diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator obtained by double diﬀerencing
sample means, may also be produced by running a regression using micro data pooled across
(treated and control) groups and (before and after) time periods with additive group and
time indicators plus an interaction term between these two indicators.
Wit = β0 + β1Di + β2At + θDi ∗ At + εit (2)
In this speciﬁcation, the variables Wit and Di refer to the wage level and to the treatment
indicator as deﬁned previously, while At is a set of time dummies that indicate for each
individual the period after (At =1 )and before (At =0 )the implementation of the reform.
In this model, both treated and control groups are identiﬁed by one single dummy variable.
When there is more than one control group, it is also required additional dummy variables
to identify each group and its interaction with time period dummies.
Finally, this simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator may also be extended (by adding a
vector of individual and ﬁrm characteristics) in order to control for diﬀerences in observable
(individual and ﬁrm) attributes between the two groups, not absorbed by the additive group
and time eﬀects. For this purpose, we add an extra subscript j to identify and isolate
ﬁrm from employee eﬀects. The “adjusted” diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator is obtained by
16running a regression of the form,
Wijt = β0 + β1Di + β2At + θDi ∗ At + φ1XijtDi + φ2Xijt(1 − Di)+αi + γj + εijt (3)
where the treatment and control group’s observable characteristics, Xijt, are allowed to have
diﬀerent eﬀects on the outcome (i.e. φ1may diﬀer from φ2). The unobservable term is
speciﬁed to be αi + γj + εijt, where the term αi captures the eﬀects of unobserved time-
invariant person characteristics, γj refers to the unobserved time invariant ﬁrm eﬀect and
εijt is assumed to be a white noise term. The estimator of policy incidence on the treatment
group, θ, corresponds to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator and indicates the (percentage)
v a r i a t i o ni nt h ew a g ed i ﬀerential between the treated and control groups during the period
considered. This eﬀect here is termed as privatisation or ownership eﬀect.
Under this setup, it is clear how critical the assumption (1) of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach is. It relies on two requirements: common macro eﬀects across groups and no com-
positional changes within (treated or control) groups. Common macro eﬀects may be violated
if treatment and control groups react diﬀerently to macro shocks. Because our treatment
and control groups (clariﬁed in detail in the following section) belong to the same industry,
where shocks are instantaneously transmitted trough (variations in) interest spreads to the
whole market, this assumption is likely to be fulﬁlled. The adoption of a universal bank-
ing model in 1986-1987, suppressing prior market specialisation and segmentation, further
enhances this common macro eﬀect, once it potentially uniforms the portfolio of customers
(households and ﬁrms) amongst the banks. Also important, since unions represent all em-
17ployees, regardless of the bank ownership, in the wage bargaining process, macro eﬀects exert
common wage pressures amongst the banks.
The requirement of no compositional eﬀects within treatment and control groups is much
more diﬃcult to meet. Table 1 and Table 2 may suggest that the composition of the treated
and control groups evolved in a nonrandom way in response to the reform. New ﬁrms, either
domestic or foreign, entered in the market with diﬀerent sizes and proﬁles in terms of human
capital attainment or gender composition. On the other hand, the introduction of the reform
aﬀected the composition of the ﬁrms being privatised. Figures in Table 2 imply a selection
process driven by, either the privatised ﬁrms themselves or by individual own self-sorting,
which led to smaller banks, with a lower education and higher age level.
A ﬁnal problem in this evaluation regards the potential endogeneity of the ownership
change. The lei Quadro das Privatizações mentions no explicit goal concerning labour market
outcomes, but ﬁrms were selected based on performance indicators during the ﬁrst phase of
(partial) privatisation. During the remaining phases, however, there was no ﬁrm schedule
and the implementation of the reform was more conditioned by the domestic economic cycle
and international context. Even if important, the potential endogeneity can not be addressed
properly, given the missing ﬁrm’s key variables in the dataset, namely total sales and social
capital, for the period and industry covered.
5 Empirical implementation and results
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator laid out above is implemented using individual-level
data from the dataset, Quadros de Pessoal collected by the Portuguese Ministry of Labour
18and Solidarity. This is an extensive database of matched employer-employee information
based upon mandatory employer reports. It provides detailed information about each unit,
ﬁrm or employee, observed. For instance, information about location, total level of employ-
ment, economic activity, type of management, total sales and social capital is available for
each ﬁrm. For each employee, gender, date of birth, level of schooling, occupation, full-
time/part-time status, earnings, duration of work and the mechanism of wage bargaining
are known, as well as the location and industry of the employing ﬁrm.
Before describing the strategy used in this study for creating the data sample and the
variables, let us state precisely the treatment eﬀect we is interested in, which will condition
the selection of treated and non-treated units. This study attempts to examine the eﬀect(s)
of privatisation on the wages of workers from the Portuguese banking industry. As the
direct target of this programme is the ﬁrm itself and not the employees, we would ideally
like to evaluate the privatisation impact on those employees that either remained, joined
or left the ﬁrm after its privatisation.15 In this case, for the “joiner or leaver” employee,
it would also be required to know the reason for their moving in or out of the ﬁrm, as
the wage accepted by moving individuals varies remarkably according to their employment
status. This kind of information is unfortunately unavailable in this dataset, which makes
it diﬃcult to interpret the results for these particular two groups. Further, if the employee
became unemployed, self-employed or employed by local/central authorities (civil servants),
we will not know which, as these organisations are not covered by this survey. In order to
15This contrasts with other types of intervention such as, the introduction of the minimum wage or the
active labour market policies, in which both the policy and evaluation object targets coincide.
19avoid these potential problems, this study strictly focuses only the eﬀect(s) of privatisation
on the wages for those employees that remained in the same ﬁrm after its privatisation.
I nt h i sw a y ,w ea r em o r el i k e l yt of u l ﬁll the assumptions of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach discussed in Section 4.16 However, the simpliﬁcation of the analysis is likely to
generate a sample selection problem if the individuals who remain within the ﬁrm do not
represent a random sample of the workforce of the ﬁrm. The potential important defect,
while recognised but not addressed directly, should be kept in mind when interpreting the
results of this approach.
Having re-deﬁned the treatment eﬀect we are interested in, let us determine our treated
and control units. Our treated units (employees) correspond to all individuals that both
work in each public ﬁrm subject to privatisation and retain their jobs after the implementa-
tion of the reform. To be more precise, let t0 and t denote two points in time, representing
respectively one period before (pre-treatment) and one after (post-treatment) the privati-
sation of a given public ﬁrm. Thus, the treated group includes all individuals that work
both in t0 and t for the ﬁrm being privatised. For selecting the non-treated units we follow
the principle “the more comparison groups the better”, (Meyer, 1995), by using informa-
tion from the remaining three ﬁrm categories, public, national and foreign, prevailing in the
banking industry to perform the analysis. Therefore, the corresponding control or untreated
groups are composed of those workers employed in the remaining public ﬁr m s( n o ts u b j e c tt o
privatisation), national and foreign ﬁrms and that, similarly, kept their jobs between t0 and
16As Blundell and Dias (2000) point out when we use repeated cross-section data and the composition





is constant over time, may not hold.
20t. Public employees form the natural candidate control group, since their employment status
is able to control for “public” speciﬁc-eﬀects in the labour market. Comparing the change
i nt h ew a g ed i ﬀerential to private (national and foreign) ﬁrm employees can be viewed as
measuring the wage eﬀort of catching up with the wage pattern paid by these groups. This
is particularly appealing when private national employees are considered. As mentioned in
Section 3, almost all new owners of privatised ﬁrms were the previous owners before the
nationalisation wave took place in the 1970s. Foreign employees appear as a neutral control
group as they were not subject to the reform but experienced common macro eﬀects.
In addition, note that the purpose of analysis is to compute the overall impact of pri-
vatisation in the banking sector and not ﬁrm by ﬁrm eﬀects. Consequently, the ten ﬁrm
privatisations’ need to be condensed into one “single privatisation”. The creation of the
data sample for estimation is a two step procedure. In the ﬁrst step, for each ﬁrm being
privatised is assigned one pre-treatment t0 and post-treatment t points in time, and the re-
spective treated and non-treated individuals are extracted. The choice of t0 and t is driven
by economic considerations. Because the ﬁrms’ process of reactive restructuring occurred
mainly after the implementation of the reform, as referred to in Section 2.3, t0 consists of a
single calendar year prior to privatisation. In particular, the conventional procedure of the
privatisation literature is followed, considering the calendar year of each ﬁrm privatisation,
the year 0. Therefore t0 = −1, corresponds to the calendar year prior to each privatisation
date. In contrast, for the post-treatment period, we allow privatisation eﬀects to vary over
time following Gupta et al.’s (2001) discussion. The post-treatment period ranges between
one and four years , t =1 , 2, 3 and 4, corresponding either to one, two, three or four cal-
21endar years after each privatisation date.17 The second step consists of aggregating in each
t0 and t points in time, all treated and non-treated individuals of the respective ten ﬁrms
privatised using a moving window a ss h o w ni nK l u v eet al. (1999).18 As a result, individuals
from privatised ﬁrms, are considered non-treated and treated at diﬀerent points in time.
The empirical analysis is based on prime-age individuals not yet subject to retirement.
Therefore, the sample is further restricted to individuals aged between 18 and 65 years ac-
cording to the deﬁnition of the vertical collective agreement prevailing in the industry. Apart
from these two requirements, only observations without complete demographic information
in t0 and t used for the outcome equation were dropped.
As the outcome variable, we use the logarithm of hourly wage constructed as the loga-
rithm of the sum of monthly base wage, plus the regular and irregular components of the
wage, payment indexed to tenure and overtime divided by normal and extra hours worked.19
Hourly wage is preferable to monthly wage because workers from privatised ﬁrms experienced
diﬀerent length of hours of work after the reform.20 In addition, wages are converted to real
terms (1998 prices) using the Consumer Price Index (IPC).
In this sample extraction design, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator from equation
3, is obtained alternatively by diﬀerencing the outcome and observable variables between
period t and t0 = −1 for each individual i, and including three indicator variables in the
17This postreatment period choice is also conditioned by the ﬁrst merger wave in 1998 in banking industry,
which involved recently privatised ﬁrms.
18This sample procedure corresponds to the examination of the eﬀects of the reform on 63%, 51%, 46%
and 43% of the banking workforce after one, two, three and four years, respectively in those institutions that
remained between t0 = −1 and t.
19The hourly wage is constructed in the same way as the literature that uses the same dataset does. See,
inter alia, Vieira et al.(1997).
20Table 7 provides summary statistics of our treated and control groups.
22model, each one referring to a control group. A separate regression of the form,
Wijt − Wijt0 = λ0 + λ1Pi + λ2Ni + λ3Fi + φ(Xijt − Xijt0)+
X
δk + εijt − εijt0 (4)
for each t equals to 1, 2, 3 and 4, is estimated, where the binary variables, Pi,N i andFi,
identify if individual i is employed in a privatised, national or foreign ﬁrm, respectively.21
The coeﬃcient λ1 corresponds to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator from equation 3, θ,
when public employees form the comparison group. Similarly, λ1 − λ2 (λ1 − λ3) gives the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator when national (foreign) employees serve as control group.
The vector X includes observable characteristics controlling for the number of schooling
years (education), seniority, potential experience and its square, logarithm of ﬁrm size and
logarithm of total duration of work.22 This speciﬁcation also allows the economic cycle
involving each privatisation,
P
δk, to have diﬀerent ( intercept) eﬀects on the outcome.23
Table 3 and 4 (Figure 1 and Figure 2) display (plot) the results of the estimated pri-
vatisation eﬀect on wages for men and women, respectively. As discussed in Section 2, the
expected theoretical eﬀects of the reform are ambiguous for these two demographic groups.
In each row, the estimates correspond to a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences privatisation eﬀect de-
ﬁned according to the control group speciﬁe di nt h el e f th a n ds i d ec o l u m no fe a c ht a b l e .F o r
21Heckman and Hotz (1989) refer to this as ﬂexible speciﬁcation, which allows diﬀerent structures of real
wage-change over time. McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) apply this model to explore the eﬀects of ownership
changes on wages and employment, using plant-level data.
22Other variables such as regional dummies, bargaining regime status, part-time status and occupation
indicators although available from the data were not, individually and jointly, statistically signiﬁcant and
thus, excluded from the analysis.
23The term
P
δk would represent six indicator variables according to each privatisation date. when t =1 .
Given the omission of the year 1990 in the dataset, this term corresponds either to ﬁve (when t =1 ) ,f o u r
(when t =2 ,3) or three (when t =4 )indicator variables.
23example, the ﬁgure -.087 (ﬁrst row, second column) from Table 3, indicates that during the
ﬁrst two years post-reform, retained men in privatised ﬁrms were paid 8.3 (e−.087 − 1) less
percent than their respective counterparts in public ﬁrms.
As Table 3 reveals, unlike former evidence, the eﬀects of privatisation vary in sign and
magnitude according to time and control group considered, as discussed by Gupta et al.
(2001). Moreover, Figure 1 seems to suggest a positive relationship between time of restruc-
turing and wage variation rate regardless the choice of the control group. During the ﬁrst
two years after privatisation, men experience negative wage growth rates, which tend to be
reversed in the subsequent periods. These wage growth losses are particularly clear over
the ﬁrst two years post implementation of the reform, regardless the choice of the compari-
son group. Then, this result supports the general objective of restructuring (cost reduction)
implicit in the implementation of the policy and indirectly conﬁrmed by Pinho (1999). As
referred previously, the Portuguese banking industry experienced a signiﬁcant improvement
in the eﬃciency level between 1988-97 particularly pronounced among the privatised insti-
tutions. Moreover, this result is also consistent with McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) ﬁndings
regarding the eﬀects of ownership changes in the US manufacturing sector: around 76% of
employees experienced lower wage growth rates after the ownership change. On the other
hand, deregulation of the product market, a related policy implemented in order to increase
the degree of product market competition, leads in general to declines in the wage growth
rate. Black and Strahan (2001), for instance, ﬁnd that in the US banking industry male
wages fell by 12.5 percent.
Three years post-reform the eﬀects of privatisation are mixed whereas in the fourth
24year after privatisation, retained employees are only in disadvantage if compared to their
counterpart in domestically owned ﬁrms as their wages grew clearly faster when compared
to public or foreign ﬁrms, respectively. For this period of analysis, the results are then
consistent to those found by Parker and Martin (1996) despite the fact that their analysis
includes all workforce regardless the gender. These authors ﬁnd that after four or ﬁve years
privatisation, wages on average, had increased (between 0.0 and 8.4 percent) in 7 out 11
privatised ﬁrms in UK when compared to the whole economy.
These results seem to suggest a change in the pay policy of privatised ﬁrms. After
ﬁrms have completed the main adjustments (elimination of redundant labour force and
reduction of wage growth), the remaining and more likely productive labour force has to be
rewarded in order to reduce turnover. In line with eﬃciency wage theories and due to the
higher homogeneity of the employees (in terms of observable or unobservable characteristics)
prevailing in the four ﬁrms’ categories, privatised ﬁrms have to pay higher wage growth rates
in order to equate the wage level paid by the remaining ﬁrms (either public or private) in
the industry. On the other hand, workers may also have employed a recognized higher
level of eﬀort and thus increased productivity, as a response of fearing an eventual threat of
dismissal given the uncertainty introduced by the reform.
For women, similar conclusions can be inferred from Table 4 (Figure 2). In particular,
the same positive relationship between wage variation and time restructuring tends to be
observed, regardless of the choice of the control group. Wage growth cuts are again obvious
across the three comparison groups throughout the two years post reform. The major diﬀer-
ence is that the intensity of wage decline with respect to public employees is lower (greater)
25t ow o m e ni nt h eﬁrst (two) year (s) of analysis. Therefore, the pattern of wage adjustment
detected suggests a U-shaped relationship when public employees are the control group.
The results presented so far regarding the eﬀects of privatisation on male and female
workers are surprising, as they seem to contradict the predictions of the Gary S. Becker
(1957) model that product market competition drives out gender discrimination. If this were
t h ec a s e ,t h e nw o m e n ,w h oe a r no na v e r a g el e s st h a nm e n ,w o u l dh a v ei m p r o v e dt h e i rr e l a t i v e
position either experiencing lower wage losses or stronger wage gains, according to the timing
of the eﬀects.24 Unless strong composition eﬀects occurred at the same time as privatisation,
such as relatively more women moving into higher skilled occupations after privatisation, the
results shown above would corroborate Gary Becker’s prediction. Nevertheless, the variable
variation in occupation was not signiﬁcant in equation 3, which rules out this hypothesis.
Next Table 5 contains the results for male top managers. Following Lopes and Silanes
(1999) work, we adopt a broad concept of top managers. We include only male top managers
who kept the same occupational category after the implementation of the reform.25 For
this group, the theoretical predictions point to a clear increase in the wage growth rate.
Surprisingly, the empirical evidence indicates the opposite eﬀect. The wage diﬀerential has
declined signiﬁcantly during the period of wage decline previously identiﬁed. Further, the
magnitude of the wage erosion, between 11 and 17 percent, is substantially greater than
the wage loss detected before. In addition, the evidence on wage growth gains after the
24Research on the impact of the product market deregulation on racial and gender discrimination, is
typically supportive of shrinking diﬀerentials. For instance, Black and Strahan (2001) reports that in the
US banking industry wages fell by 12.5 and 2.9 percent, for men and women respectively, after branching
deregulation.
25Results remain qualitatively unchanged when we include all top managers, even those who moved to a
lower occupation in the ﬁrm.
26second year is less compelling. A possible explanation for this ﬁnding may be related to the
downsizing strategy introduced, which possibly altered their level of supervision.
These ﬁndings may suggest that this group had been enjoying substantial rents before the
implementation of the reform. In order to examine further the robustness of this hypothesis,
the equation previously speciﬁed is also estimated considering each of the three components of
the logarithm of hourly wage. We run the equation using three diﬀerent dependent variables:
the logarithm of the hourly eﬀective wage as deﬁned by the vertical collective agreement, the
logarithm of irregular subsidies and the logarithm of regular subsidies of the wage. Table 6
presents the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates for these three wage components.
As suspected, two or three years after the introduction of the reform, the main driving
forces explaining the wage diﬀerential decline are the irregular or regular components of the
hourly wage. During the two ﬁrst years post reform, the irregular wage subsidies diﬀerential
was reduced between 75 and 83 percent. However, this was observed only for a narrow
subsample of managers. For the remaining managers, the cuts in the regular subsidies are
certainly the main cause for the erosion of the total hourly wage examined three years post-
reform. These results are however, not free from criticism. Although there is no recorded
data, it is well-known that in the banking industry, managers enjoy fat bonuses not included
in their cash compensation such as free car or excellent insurance schemes.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper examines the impact of privatisation on wages in the Portuguese banking industry
for the period 1989-1997 using individual-level longitudinal data from Quadros de Pessoal.
27The design of privatisation reform and the quality of the data employed, allow us, not only
to overcome the main limitations of the previous labour market privatisation literature, but
also to improve it in a number of ways.
First, because privatisation reform did not aﬀect all public banks and the structure
of the industry is diverse, the eﬀect of privatisation is evaluated taking into account three
comparison ﬁrm groups within the banking sector. Thus, the comparison with groups within
the same industry guarantees, in principle, that the impact of any other economic factor not
controlled for can be adequately eliminated by the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator.
The quality and nature of the matched employer-employee dataset enable us to build
a balanced panel data and thus, assess the privatisation impacts on dimensions not yet
explored. The eﬀects were examined on those individuals who remained in privatised ﬁrms
after the introduction of the reform. In particular, the eﬀects were analysed on three diﬀerent
demographic groups: men, women and male top managers. Further, in contrast with almost
all previous research, this study uses the actual instead of estimated (total labour costs
divided the level of employment) wage paid to individuals and controls for diﬀerences in
human capital attainments. Finally, the longitudinal nature of the dataset permits us to
appraise the magnitude of the privatisation eﬀects over time. The eﬀects of privatisation on
wages were examined after one, two, three and four years of its introduction.
The main lesson of this paper is that the time dimension of analysis is highly important.
F o rb o t hm e na n dw o m e n ,a positive relationship between time of restructuring and wage
variation seem to appear, regardless of the choice of the comparison group. During the
ﬁrst and second years after the introduction of reform, both demographic groups experience
28deﬁnite wage losses, which tend to be reversed after the third year. Hence, the results
presented in this study conﬁrm the previous research if long term eﬀects are considered.
Nevertheless, wages in privatised ﬁrms, again for both men and women, tend to align with the
pattern paid by the remaining ﬁrms in the industry. Estimates for top managers surprisingly
contradict the theoretical predictions as this group experienced stronger and lasting wage
growth losses than the average overall distribution.
There are at least two potentially important areas for further research. First, the results
may be biased due to the sample selection problem not addressed here. A re-evaluation of
this complex observational study would be useful. A full evaluation of privatisation eﬀects
would also require consideration of how wages evolved for displaced workers.
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33Table 1: Employment and wage levels by ﬁrm ownership, 1989-1997
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Average employment per ﬁrm
Public 7,323 6,771 6,812 6,793 6,856
Privatised 3,884 3,733 3,663 3,425 3,152
National 318 652 619 537 203
Foreign 134 185 174 209 409
Full time status (%)
Public 89.1 91.5 95.2 98.0 98.5
Privatised 83.3 98.5 96.3 98.4 98.7
National 98.9 97.4 99.7 99.6 99.5
Foreign 98.6 99.1 98.9 99.8 99.1













































Number of unemployed people from the ﬁnancial sector
Women 1,400 3,400 5,800 8,600 8,700
Total 3,100 5,700 12,000 18,300 16,200
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997) and INE (Inquérito ao Emprego - 4otrimestre).
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.
34Table 2: Mean attributes of banking employees by ﬁrm ownership, 1989-1997
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Male (%)
Public 66.6 65.4 64.9 61.4 59.2
Privatised 75.4 74.0 72.1 71.6 70.8
National 88.0 92.1 92.0 82.9 69.2
Foreign 60.0 61.6 62.1 61.9 74.9
Schooling
Public 9.7 9.8 10.1 10.7 10.9
Privatised 9.2 9.2 9.3 10.1 10.6
National 11.1 11.2 11.3 12.3 12.9
Foreign 10.7 11.3 11.2 12.8 12.8
Age
Public 40.7 42.5 42.7 40.4 40.9
Privatised 40.7 41.9 42.8 43.3 43.7
National 32.3 30.8 30.9 32.9 34.1
Foreign 36.7 35.1 35.0 33.9 36.9
Tenure
Public 13.9 15.7 16.0 14.2 14.7
Privatised 14.0 15.2 16.0 17.0 17.5
National 4.8 1.8 2.3 4.4 4.4
Foreign 9.8 7.2 6.5 5.0 6.6
Experience
Public 25.0 26.7 26.6 23.8 24.0
Privatised 25.4 26.7 27.5 27.2 27.2
National 15.2 13.6 13.6 14.6 15.3
Foreign 20.0 17.8 17.7 15.0 18.1
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
35Table 3: DinD estimates of the impact of privatisation on the log hourly wage of men





























R2 .163 .174 .163 .168
Sample size 110,601 69,030 52,983 33,671
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All coeﬃcients are statiscally signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level
or less, except that marked with a).
Table 4: DinD estimates of the privatisation impact on the log hourly wage of women





























R2 .195 .208 .197 .270
Sample size 41,551 23,691 19,450 13,209
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All coeﬃcients are statiscally signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level
or less, except that marked with a).
Table 5: DinD estimates of the privatisation impact on the log hourly wage of top managers





























R2 .174 .112 .106 .124
Sample size 7,702 4,657 3,550 2,066
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statiscally signiﬁcant at the 1, 5 or 10
percent level, respectively.
36Table 6: DinD estimates of the privatisation impact on the log wage components of male
top managers
Public National Foreign Sample R2
Time eﬀect Wage components



















































































(.180) 2 ,039 .064
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistically signiﬁcant from
zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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39Table 7: Description of the data in time period t
t=1 t=2
variables Pub. Privatis. Nat. For. Pub. Privatis. Nat. For.
ln(wage) 7.43 7.33 7.46 7.72 7.41 7.32 7.50 7.71
male (%) 66.1 73.4 76.1 59.7 63.8 73.6 77.9 60.2
schooling 9.6 9.2 10.2 11.6 9.5 9.3 110.2 11.2
age 43.8 44.1 41.9 36.7 45.1 44.9 41.9 37.8
tenure 17.5 17.4 15.3 7.85 19.4 18.3 15.3 8.5
experience 28.1 28.9 25.6 19.1 29.6 29.6 25.8 20.6
ln(duration) 4.99 4.98 5.00 5.04 4.99 5.04 5.03 5.04
part-time (%) 4.2 1.5 1.6 1.2 6.4 2.8 1.7 .9
occupation
Top managers 5.0 5.3 7.3 21.3 5.1 5.4 7.4 21.7
other managers 8.3 9.0 10.3 7.9 8.5 9.5 10.1 7.9
foremen 4.6 4.2 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.8 3.3 2.8
highly skilled 7.6 7.4 8.7 9.8 8.9 8.7 7.9 10.3
skilled 66.8 65.5 65.7 52.4 65.8 64.7 66.6 52.6
unskilled 7.8 8.1 4.7 4.9 8.2 7.8 4.7 4.6
region
North 23.3 22.3 38.2 - 23.8 25 45.7
Lisbon 72.3 75.8 59.1 100 67.3 75 51.6 100
Isles 4.4 1.9 2.7 - 8.9 0 2.7
Sample 40,577 23,450 84,889 3,236 14,245 18,880 57,057 2,539
t=3 t=4
ln(wage) 7.47 7.38 7.52 7.63 7.43 7.49 7.56 7.66
male (%) 60.8 73.9 75.7 61.6 61.5 75.9 75.9 59.1
schooling 9.8 9.6 10.1 11.7 10.2 9.65 10.1 12.0
age 45.7 45.6 43.4 38.5 44.1 44.8 44.1 39.4
tenure 20.6 19.1 17.2 9.49 18.1 18.6 17.9 10.9
experience 29.9 30.0 27.3 20.7 27.9 29.2 28.0 21.5
ln(duration) 4.98 5.02 5.02 5.04 5.03 4.98 5.04 5.05
part-time (%) 6.5 1.0 1.4 .0 2.7 1.8 1.2 .0
occupation
Top managers 5.6 5.8 7.6 20.7 4.7 7.3 7.4 20.3
other managers 8.8 10.3 12.0 8.8 8.4 13.3 12.4 9.1
foremen 2.7 3.8 3.4 3.9 4.5 3.9 3. 4.7
highly skilled 9.9 9.6 9.9 10.7 8.0 10.5 10.9 10.3
skilled 66.5 64.5 62.4 53.5 68.3 58.0 61.7 54.1
unskilled 6.4 6.0 4.6 3.0 6.1 6.8 4.2 1.5
region
North 1.5 24.8 34.0 - 7.2 35.9 -
Lisbon 89.9 75.1 62.6 100 96.7 92.7 61.6 100
Isles 8.6 3.4 3.2 - 2.3 -
Sample 9,487 17,212 44,484 1,250 12,504 8,952 24,844 536
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